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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-4700 
 ___________ 
 
 HARRY A. PANGEMANAN; 
MARIYANA SUNARTO, 
        Petitioners 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                               Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency Nos. A096-265-808 and A096-265-809) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
 
 Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 13, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Harry Pangemanan and Mariyana Sunarto, a married couple who are citizens of 
Indonesia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision 
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denying their motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
I 
 The petitioners’ case has a rather long and complicated procedural history.  In 
2004, the petitioners received notices to appear, charging them as removable for 
overstaying their authorized periods of admission.  Before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), 
the petitioners -- represented by Joyce Antila Phipps -- conceded removability.  A.R. 521.  
Pangemanan sought cancellation of removal, Sunarto sought withholding of removal, and 
both petitioners requested voluntary departure.  A.R. 521-22.  The IJ denied their requests 
for cancellation and withholding, but granted voluntary departure.  A.R. 518-19. 
 The petitioners appealed to the BIA, again represented by attorney Phipps.  On 
February 27, 2006, the BIA dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the petitioners 
failed to demonstrate entitlement to the relief requested.  A.R. 337-39.  The petitioners 
then retained attorney John Perez, who filed in this Court a timely petition for review.  
See Pangemanan v. Att’y Gen., 259 F. App’x 429, 431 (3d Cir. 2007).  We dismissed the 
petition in part and denied it in part.  See id. at 432. 
 The following month, January 2008, the petitioners retained attorney David 
Haghighi to file a motion to reopen their immigration proceedings before the BIA.  
However, Houman Varzandeh, an attorney from Haghighi’s office, did not file the 
motion to reopen until January 2009.  A.R. 335.  Although the petitioners, through new 
 3 
 
counsel, sought to withdraw that motion on February 23, 2009, the BIA failed to 
associate the motion to withdraw with the motion to reopen, and erroneously adjudicated 
the motion to reopen.  In its February 24, 2009, decision, the BIA held that the motion to 
reopen was untimely, and that the petitioners’ argument that they satisfied the “changed 
country conditions” exception to the 90-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen 
lacked merit.  A.R. 285. 
 Then, in March 2009, the petitioners -- through present counsel, Joan Pinnock --  
filed with the BIA a new motion to reopen, asserting that attorneys Phipps and Haghighi 
provided deficient performance.
1
  A.R. 124-214.  On March 20, 2009, the BIA denied 
their motion to reopen.  A.R. 115-16.  The Board held that the motion was time- and 
number-barred, and reasoned that the petitioners failed to make out a colorable deficient 
performance claim.  With regard to attorney Phipps, the BIA concluded that the 
petitioners had not demonstrated due diligence in discovering and seeking to cure the 
alleged deficient performance; with regard to attorney Haghighi, the BIA concluded that, 
because their first motion to reopen would have been untimely even if it had been filed 
when the attorney was retained, the petitioners were not prejudiced by the delay in filing 
the motion.  Id.   
 The petitioners filed a motion to reconsider.  A.R. 32-35.  In a decision dated 
                                                 
1
  The petitioners argued that Phipps improperly failed to discuss with them the 
consequences of voluntary departure, and that she failed to inform them of the BIA’s 
February 2006 decision.  The petitioners argued that Haghighi improperly delayed 
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May 6, 2009, the BIA granted the motion to reconsider and concluded that, because the 
petitioners’ January 2009 motion to reopen should have been deemed withdrawn, their 
March 2009 motion to reopen was incorrectly held to be number-barred.  A.R. 22.  
Accordingly, the Board vacated its February 24, 2009, and March 20, 2009, decisions.  
Id.  However, the BIA again denied the motion to reopen, reasoning that, for the reasons 
articulated in its March 20, 2009, decision, the petitioners’ motion to reopen was 
untimely, and they failed to make out a colorable deficient performance claim under 
Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009) (“Compean I”). 
 In June 2009, the petitioners filed in this Court a petition for review of the Board’s 
May 2009 decision.  See Pangemanan v. Att’y Gen., C.A. No. 09-2641.  We granted the 
Government’s unopposed motion to remand proceedings to the BIA for reconsideration 
in light of the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 25 
I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009) (“Compean II”), which vacated Compean I and ordered the 
Agency to apply the pre-Compean standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel as grounds for reopening immigration proceedings.  C.A. No. 09-2641 (order 
filed July 29, 2009). 
 On remand, the BIA granted reconsideration in light of Compean II.  A.R. 4.  
However, the Board again reasoned that the motion to reopen was untimely, and that the 
petitioners failed to demonstrate due diligence with respect to their claims against 
                                                                                                                                                             
filing their motion to reopen for a year after he was first retained. 
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attorney Phipps or prejudice concerning their claims against attorney Haghighi.  Id. at 4-
5.  Accordingly, the Board denied the petitioners’ motion to reopen.  Id. at 5.  The 
petitioners filed a timely petition for review of that decision. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
We review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  See Fadiga 
v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under that standard, we will not reverse 
the Board’s decision unless “it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id. (quoting 
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 A “motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order of removal.”  INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)].  
However, ineffective assistance of counsel can serve as a basis for equitably tolling the 
limitations period in immigration cases.  See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 251 
(3d Cir. 2005).  To obtain equitable tolling of the limitations period based on ineffective 
assistance, the petitioners had to show that competent counsel would have acted 
differently and that, absent counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome of their proceedings would have been different.  See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157, 
159-60.  They also had to demonstrate that they acted diligently in pursuing their 
ineffective assistance claim.  See Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 252. 
 With regard to the petitioners’ ineffective assistance claim against Haghighi, the 
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BIA reasoned that the petitioners failed to show that they were prejudiced by the delay in 
filing the motion to reopen because, even if Haghighi had filed the motion as soon as he 
was retained, it would nevertheless have been untimely.  The record shows that BIA 
dismissed the petitioners’ appeal in February 2006, but they did not retain Haghighi until 
almost two years later -- well beyond the 90-day limit for filing a motion to reopen.  
Although the motion to reopen filed by Haghighi’s office invoked the “changed country 
conditions” exception to the 90-day time limit, see INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), the Board held 
that the exception did not apply.
2
  We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in the 
Board’s determination that the petitioners did not demonstrate prejudice resulting from 
Haghighi’s representation. 
 Likewise, the Board did not abuse its discretion in holding that the petitioners 
failed to diligently pursue their ineffective assistance claim against attorney Phipps.  The 
petitioners arguably should have known about any deficiencies in Phipps’s representation 
in March 2006, when they retained John Perez as new counsel and filed a petition for 
review.  Yet they raised no arguments calling Phipps’s performance into question until 
March 2009, i.e., three years, three attorneys, and two motions to reopen after they had 
worked with Phipps.  The petitioners have not shown that the BIA’s decision was 
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” 
                                                 
2
  The propriety of the Board’s conclusion that the first motion to reopen was 
untimely is not an issue presently before this Court.  We note that the petitioners do 
not challenge in their brief that aspect of the Board’s analysis. 
 7 
 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review. 
